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Abstract
Objective: The aim of this study was to develop a policy characterisation process based on
measuring shifts in use of private health insurance (PHI) immediately following implementation of
changes in federal health care policy.
Method: Population-based hospital morbidity data from 1980 to 2001 were used to produce trend
lines in the annual proportions of public, privately insured and privately uninsured hospital
separations in age-stratified subgroups. A policy characterisation model was developed using visual
and statistical assessment of the trend lines associated with changes in federal health care policy.
Results: Of eight changes in federal health care policy, two (introduction of Medicare and Lifetime
Health Cover) were directly associated with major changes in the trend lines; however, minor
changes in trends were associated with several of the other federal policies. Three types of policy
effects were characterised by our model: direction change, magnitude change and inhibition.
Results from our model suggest that a policy of Lifetime Health Cover, with a sanction for late
adoption of PHI, was immediately successful in changing the private: public mix. The desired effect
of the 30% rebate was immediate only in the oldest age group (70+ years), however, introduction
of the lifetime health cover and limitations in the model restricted the ability to determine whether
or if the rebate had a delayed effect at younger ages.
Conclusion: An outcome-based policy characterisation model is useful in evaluating immediate
effects of changes in health care policy.
Introduction
Private health insurance (PHI) is one of the foundations
of the Australian health system [1]. Unlike the Unites
States, however, the Australian Government provides uni-
versal access to free public hospital care, with ambulatory
care and pharmaceuticals being available subject to lim-
ited client co-payments via Medicare and the Pharmaceu-
tical Benefits Scheme [2]. The return of a Liberal federal
government to Australia in 1996 marked a resurgence of
policy interest in the uptake of PHI [3]. The justification
for the policies introduced was that falling PHI member-
ship, observed since the introduction of Medicare in
1984, was thought to have increased the demand on the
public system [4,5] and, therefore, promoting growth in
the private sector would take the pressure off public hos-
pitals and restore balance to the health care system [6].
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Subsequent policy initiatives concentrated on increasing
PHI coverage by a mixture of 'carrots' (the private health
insurance incentive scheme in 1997, partially replaced by
a 30% non-means tested rebate on PHI premiums in
1999) and 'sticks' (a Medicare levy surcharge in 1997 for
high income earners who did not take out PHI; and Life-
time Health Cover in 2000, whereby higher premiums
were paid by those who delayed taking out PHI until after
the age of 30 years) [7].
To date, analyses of the effects of policies aimed at sup-
porting PHI in Australia have primarily centred on
changes in the proportion of the population covered by
PHI [2,4,7,8]. However, a distinction between uptake of
PHI and use of PHI is archetypal of the distinction
between outputs and outcomes, where outputs document
the amount, quality or volume of use of a services product
and outcomes reveal the impact the service has on its par-
ticipants (change in behaviour, attitude or condition) [9].
Changes in the uptake of PHI are necessary but do not of
themselves provide sufficient evidence to evaluate out-
comes of policies aimed at reducing the pressure on the
public system. Rather, the effectiveness of such policies
would be better judged by changes in PHI use.
The aim of this study was to use changes in the utilisation
of payment classifications for in-patient hospitalisation to
develop a process capable of characterising policy changes
according to their observable outcomes. The intention
being to aid in the analysis of the effects of health care pol-
icies directed towards reducing the pressure on the public
hospital system.
Methods
The WA Data Linkage System [10] was used to extract all
hospital morbidity data from 1 January 1980 to 31
December 2001 for the State of Western Australia (popu-
lation 1.8 million), comprising encrypted patient identifi-
ers and episode numbers, age, gender, date of admission,
date of separation and payment classification (public,
uninsured private, insured private, or "other").
The proportion of the total number of separations in each
relevant payment category in each year was calculated
according to gender and age group (0–16 yrs, 17–39 yrs,
40–69 yrs, 70+ yrs). The "other" payment categories,
which included workers compensation, motor vehicle,
defence force personnel and Veteran Affairs patients, were
removed from the analysis, leaving only the categories of
public, private insured and private uninsured. This was
done because the study was principally concerned with
elective shifts between private insurance and public cate-
gories; not prescribed payment classifications due to man-
datory funding arrangements.
Table 1: Federal health care policy changes (cut points)
Federal Health Policy "Cut Points"
Cut Point Commencement (and duration) 
of initiative*
Description of Initiative
1 Sept 1981 (- Jan 1984) Abolition of free public hospital care
2 Feb 1984 (- Oct 1986) Medicare introduced (Universal bulk billing and free public hospital care restored)
Out of hospital rebate set at 85% of scheduled fee
Maximum rebate set at $10
Levy set at 1%
3 Nov 1986 (- June 1993) Medicare levy increased to 1.25%
Out of hospital rebate @ 85%/$20
GAP set at $150/annum
In hospital rebate set at 75% with no maximum
Private hospital insurance to cover remaining 25%
4 1993 (- 1995) Medicare Levy increased to 1.4%
5 1995 (- 1997) Medicare Levy increased to 1.5%
0.2% Surcharge introduced to pay for a guns "buy back" following Port Arthur massacre
6 1997 (-1999) Private Health Insurance Incentive Scheme: Surcharge of 1% introduced for high 
income household without PHI.
GAP cover policies allowed (No GAP and known GAP)
Simplified billing (use of billing agents)
7 Jan 1999 (- June 2000) Uncapped 30% PHI† rebate for hospital and ancillary benefits with no means test
8 July 2000 (- Present) Lifetime Health Cover: Differential premiums allowed based on age at initial premium.
Informed Consent: Patients provided with quotes on costs prior to procedure 
commencement
* Financial year unless otherwise indicated
† Private Health InsuranceAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/27
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Development of the Policy Characterisation Model
The annual relative proportion of episodes in each pay-
ment classification (public, private insured and private
uninsured) were graphed as segmented trend lines strati-
fied by age group and gender. The development of a
model to characterise the policies was undertaken by ana-
lysing the interaction of the gender and age specific seg-
mented trend lines with the major changes in federal
health care policy, termed 'cut points' (see table 1) for
each payment classification. The process developed is
shown in figure 1 with each component described below.
Stage 1: Identification and classification of inflection points in 
adjacent trend segments
For each policy change trend segments included in the
analysis were determined in the following manner (refer
to figure 2):
• Trend segment one was defined as the segmented trend
line connecting the proportion of episodes two years prior
with that one year prior to the policy change (series points
1 and 2).
• Trend segment two was defined as the segmented trend
line connecting the proportion of episodes one year prior
with that in the year of implementation of the policy
change (series points 2 and 3).
Trend segments one and two were assessed visually to
determine the occurrence and classification of inflections
(changes in the magnitude or direction of the slope).
Inflections were classified as either:
1. Not observed (no appreciable difference in either the
magnitude of the slope or direction of trend section two
relative to trend section one).
2. Magnitude changing (the slope of trend section two was
appreciably different in magnitude to that of trend section
one)
3. Direction changing (the direction of trend section two
was different to that of trend section one).
Where inflections were not observed, the policy change
was deemed to have had no effect on the trend in utilisa-
tion and no further analysis was undertaken (refer to fig-
ure 1). However, if an inflection was observed the process
continued to stage two, as detailed below.
Stage 2: Determination of a significant difference in the proportion 
of episodes
Where an inflection point was identified significance test-
ing of the equality of the proportion of episodes for series
points two and three (the year immediately prior to the
policy change and the year of implementation of the pol-
icy change, refer to figure 2) was performed using a z test
based on the normal approximation to the binomial dis-
tribution. This test used the z statistic to test the two sided
alternative that two proportions were the same.
Schematic of the identification of the trend segments  included in the analysis Figure 2
Schematic of the identification of the trend segments 
included in the analysis.
Policy Change
(cut point)
%
Series point 1 Series point 2 Series point 3
Year
The policy characterisation process Figure 1
The policy characterisation process.
Identification of inflection point
Policy characterised as
No Effect
Significance testing of equality of
proportions (series points 2 & 3)
No Yes
Significant Difference Non Significant Difference
Inhibitory (Type 3) Change in direction of trend
Direction changing
(Type 1)
Magnitude changing
(Type 2)
No Yes
Policy characterised as
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Stage 3: Outcome of the significance testing
Characterisation of those policies deemed to have had an
impact was undertaken depending upon the results of the
significance testing. A non-significant difference between
series points 2 and 3 (p value greater than 0.05) resulted
in the policy being deemed as an inhibitory policy (type
3). However, a significant difference between series points
2 and 3 (p value less than or equal to 0.05) required the
classification of the direction of the inflection to be inte-
grated into the analysis.
Stage 4: Integration of the classification of the inflection
Those policy changes associated with inflections classified
by stage one as direction changing were subsequently
termed direction changing policies (type 1). While those
policy changes associated with inflections classified by
stage one as magnitude changing were subsequently
termed magnitude changing policies (type 2).
Quantification of the rates of change associated with 
inflections
So as to investigate in more detail changes in utilisation
associated with observed inflections a separate analysis
was conducted quantifying changes in the rate of change
of the annual proportion of episodes associated with the
introduction of those policies identified in stage 1 as
showing an observable inflection. This was achieved by
representing each segmented trend segment as a straight
line having the following mathematical properties y =
a+bx (where 'a' is the intercept and 'b' is the slope). This
analysis was carried out for trend segments 1 and 2 (see
figure 2). Differences in the rate of change (slope of the
trend segment expressed as percentage change per year)
for all payment classifications by gender and age group
were calculated
Results
Figure 3 shows the temporal positions of the eight federal
health care policy cut points overlaid on the segmented
The eight federal cut points overlaid on trend line data for gender and age group Figure 3
The eight federal cut points overlaid on trend line data for gender and age group.
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trend lines of the proportions of annual episodes in each
payment classification in each age group in males and
females.
Observation and quantification in changes in trend
In general the shape of the trends was similar in males and
females. In some age groups, particularly the 17–39 years
age group, there was a near-constant difference in propor-
tion between the genders. Given this finding to simplify
the analysis the genders were combined. The shape of the
segmented trend lines; however, varied significantly
across age groups, with the two younger age groups expe-
riencing the largest changes in payment classification
mainly over the early part of the observation period. The
oldest age group had the least annual differences and a
more stable overall trend.
Federal policy initiatives that were associated with major
rate changes or inflections in the trend lines were federal
cut points 2 (the re-introduction of free public hospital
care via Medicare) and 8 (Lifetime Health Care). Federal
cut point 2 was associated with acceleration in the rate of
decline in the proportion of privately insured episodes
and a greater rate of increase in the proportion of public
episodes in all four age groups.
Federal cut point 8 was another major inflection point
associated with a surge in the private insurance payment
classification in all except the oldest age group. For the
younger three age groups the shift in direction was of sim-
ilar magnitude as shown in table 2. The magnitude of the
change in rates associated with the introduction of Life-
time Health Cover was smaller in absolute terms, as well
Table 2: The rates of change of the proportion of public and private insured episodes pre and post federal cut points 2 (Medicare) and 
8 (Lifetime Health Cover).
Age Group Gender Payment 
Classification
Rate of change in proportion 
(% change in 1 year)
Change of 
Direction
Difference in Rate 
(% change in 1 year)
Federal cut point 2 1982–83 1983–84
0–16 years M Public 2.14 22.45 NO 20.312
F 2.60 19.73 NO 17.135
M Private Insured -2.99 -20.32 NO 17.333
F -3.35 -17.65 NO 14.296
17–39 years M Public 4.27 22.82 NO 18.549
F 3.10 15.83 NO 12.730
M Private Insured -5.17 -18.88 NO 13.709
F -3.87 -14.46 NO 10.590
40–69 years M Public 1.38 14.87 NO 13.489
F 1.88 10.52 NO 8.647
M Private Insured -1.99 -13.35 NO 11.362
F -2.44 -9.45 NO 7.002
70+ years M Public 0.17 5.96 NO 5.797
F 1.40 2.80 NO 1.401
M Private Insured -0.68 -5.35 NO 4.674
F -1.91 -2.28 NO 0.370
Federal cut point 8 1998–99 1999–00
0–16 years M Public 0.90 -2.49 Yes 3.398
F 0.74 -1.95 Yes 2.691
M Private Insured -1.13 3.09 Yes 4.219
F -1.06 3.08 Yes 4.143
17–39 years M Public 0.35 -1.85 Yes 2.196
F 1.44 -1.03 Yes 2.475
M Private Insured -0.43 2.81 Yes 3.232
F -1.69 1.98 Yes 3.672
40–69 years M Public 2.04 -2.74 Yes 4.787
F 2.12 -1.01 Yes 3.129
M Private Insured -2.17 3.20 Yes 5.362
F -1.97 1.63 Yes 3.608Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/27
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as in the opposite direction to that associated with the
introduction of Medicare.
Less marked changes in the trends, in addition to the
major ones described above, were observed to coincide
with all federal cut points to some degree, although none
was seen consistently in all combinations of payment
classification and age group. The largest of these minor
rate changes was associated with federal cut point 3 (see
table 1) in the youngest age group. These changes
involved inflections in the segmented trend lines with
absolute differences slightly in excess of 3.5 percent per
year. The remaining observable changes ranged from 2.3
percent to 0.7 percent per year.
Significance testing in those cut points deemed to be 
associated with inflections
Significance tests of the equivalence of the proportion of
episodes one year prior to and in the year of implementa-
tion for federal policy cut points associated with observa-
ble inflections are summarized in tables 3 and 4. Most
federal policy initiatives that showed an observable
change in trend were also associated with a significant
change (p < 0.05) in private: public mix. The most notable
exception to this occurred in the elderly age group. In
those aged 70+ years, cut points 7 (designed to increase
the proportion of persons holding private health insur-
ance by making it more affordable) was not associated
with a significant difference.
The privately uninsured payment classification was the
least affected by policy changes over time. However, the
two most influential policies, being the introduction of
Medicare (cut point 2) and Lifetime Health Cover (cut
point 8), were both associated with significant reductions
in the proportions of private uninsured patients in several
age groups, albeit that the shifts were towards the public
and private insured payment classifications respectively.
Once again in the oldest age group neither of these cut
points was associated with a significant difference.
Characterisation of policy effects
Four types of policies were identified by the policy charac-
terisation model. Those that had no effect; type 1, those
that affected the direction of the trend; type 2, those that
affected the magnitude of the trend, but not its direction;
and type 3, those that inhibited the trend (the pre policy
trend was positive or negative, but significance testing
indicated no-significant difference in the proportions post
policy). It should be noted that type 3 policies prevented
(or subdued) a pre-existing trend from continuing. The
results of the characterisation of federal policies from
1980 to 2001 related to age group are detailed in table 5.
Discussion
In free markets consumers and suppliers are left alone to
interact and balance supply and demand for services. It is
generally accepted that governments need to intervene in
health markets to provide certain services and regulate the
market. This intervention occurs via specific policy action
[11]. In Australia the Commonwealth Government's deci-
sion to subsidise PHI has meant that it has increased its
stake in the private sector alongside its existing stake in the
public sector.
Controversy has raged about the success of the Common-
wealth Government's policies with regard to supporting
PHI in order to reduce the pressure on the public sector.
The major debate has centered around the effectiveness of
the 30% rebate and more recently the effectiveness of the
Lifetime Health Care policy [4,7,8,2-15]. However, in
most cases, commentators have used evidence relating to
the changing prevalence of PHI membership, pre and post
policy implementation. This may not be an accurate
method to assess the effectiveness of such policies,
because the policies themselves may promote the uptake
of PHI for non-health related reasons, such as to avoid a
tax penalty in high income households (cut point 6). This
coupled with the finding that since 1998 the proportion
of PHI fund members with high front-end deductibles has
significantly increased [4] means that uptake of PHI may
Table 3: Federal cut points associated with significant (p < 0.05) changes in the proportion of episodes and inflections or substantial 
changes in trend by age group
Federal Healthcare Policy Cut Points
Age Group Public Private Insured Private Uninsured
Age 0–16 yrs 2,5,6,8 2,5,8 2
Age 17–39 yrs 2,3,5,7,8 2,3,7,8 8
Age 40 – 69 yrs 2,4,5,7,8 2,4,5,7,8 2,8
Age 70+ yrs 2,6 2,6
Shaded areas = no cut points associated with significant changes and inflections or trend changes for the age group/couplet type combinationAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/27
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not necessarily lead to the expected changes in use of the
public and private systems. This is quite apart from the
debate about the price elasticity of demand for PHI and
the assumption that demand for hospital care is a fixed
commodity [4]. Our study has developed and used a pol-
icy characterisation model based on measuring shifts in
the actual use of PHI at the time of receiving hospital serv-
ices. This may be a more appropriate methodology for
evaluating likely changes in the pressure on the public sys-
tem affected by particular policies.
The results of our analysis indicate that federal cut point
2, the re-introduction of free public hospital care via
Medicare, was a magnitude changing policy. This was an
unexpected finding since it has been previously assumed
that the introduction of Medicare, following on from an
era when free public hospital care was abolished, would
be a direction changing policy. However, our data indicate
that a reversal in trend in favour of the public system
occurred one year prior to the introduction of Medicare.
Federal cut point 8, Lifetime Health Cover, was classified
by our model as a direction changing policy in the
younger three age groups with no effect observed in the
oldest age group (individuals born prior to 1 July 1934 are
exempt from Lifetime Health Cover). This finding was
thus consistent with the objective of the policy, which was
to reverse the declining trend in possession and use of PHI
to reduce the burden on the public system. It would
appear that this was achieved immediately post-imple-
mentation.
The effects of the 30% rebate (federal cut point 7) on lev-
els of PHI have been one of the most hotly contested
political issues surrounding heath care policy in recent
times. Commentators have argued for and against this
policy initiative mainly on a cost-benefit platform [4, 12,
14, 16]. Our analysis found that the effect of federal cut
point 7 was related to age. This policy was associated
immediately in time with a change in the magnitude of
the existing negative trend (PHI) or a negative to positive
change of direction (public) in the middle two age groups,
and an inhibitory effect on the downward trend in the
oldest age group, with no effect observed in the youngest
age group. Thus the 30% rebate appears to have had the
desired effect on PHI use (ie reducing the pressure on the
public system) in the oldest age group, but no immediate
desired effect in the younger age groups. To some extent
this can be explained because younger members are not as
likely to be hospitalised compared with older members,
thus reducing the likelihood of an immediate effect on
use. While older Australians are not only more likely to be
hospitalised and therefore have more opportunity to use
PHI, but are also more likely to be attracted to purchase
PHI due to reduced cost because the price elasticity of PHI
is different for younger and older individuals.
Limitations of the model
For practical reasons the immediate effects of the policies
were the only effects able to be characterised by our model
due to the plethora of federal health care policy changes,
especially from 1993 onwards. To try to characterise the
changes in trends over an extended period would have
resulted in evaluation of the mix of effects produced by
more than one policy. This is especially relevant when
examining the effects of the 30% rebate and Lifetime
Health Cover, where only one year separated the two pol-
icy changes.
A second limitation of this policy characterisation method
is that it cannot accurately take into account enforced
waiting periods, which are mandatorily applied to indi-
viduals taking out PHI who have a previous history of an
illness or condition. Thus some underestimation of the
effects of policies may be inherent in the model. Extend-
ing the model over two years post policy initiation is
problematic, as discussed above, because the effect
observed would then be confounded by subsequent pol-
icy changes. Another issue to be taken into account is the
timing and extent of marketing of the policy to the public
by government and the private insurance industry. In the
case of Lifetime Health Cover, exhaustive marketing, the
'Run for Cover Campaign', was undertaken over several
months leading up to its implementation. It is reasonable
to assume that changes in behaviour, in this case purchas-
Table 4: Federal cut points associated non-significant (p > 0.05) changes in the proportion of episodes and inflections or substantial 
changes in trend by age group
Federal Healthcare Policy Cut Points
Age Group Public Private Insured Private Uninsured
Age 0–16 yrs 33 , 68
Age 17–39 yrs 2,5
Age 40 – 69 yrs
Age 70+ yrs 772
Shaded areas = no cut points associated with non-significant changes and inflections or trend changes for the age group/couplet type combinationAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:27 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/27
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ing of PHI, were likely to have been made prior to the pol-
icy implementation date, thus some of the waiting period,
if applicable, would have been served prior to the policy
implementation date. Conversely, advantage could be
taken of the 30% rebate at any time after, but not before
January 1999. The net result of these two limitations on
our policy characterisation model may be that of cancel-
ling each other out in the case of Lifetime Health Cover
and causing a latent period between cause and effect in
the case of the 30% rebate.
In addition, it could be argued that since the waiting
period only applies to pre-existing conditions, those wish-
ing to use newly acquired PHI for such a condition would
be doing so to facilitate a more expedient health interven-
tion than could be achieved in the public sector. As such
these episodes of care would not normally have been
observed in the public system over the same period, but
rather at a later time. Under these circumstances the wait-
ing time for benefits may serve to enhance the validity of
a characterisation model employing a latent period.
Finally, our policy characterisation model does not allow
for the possibility of an earlier policy initiative synergising
with a subsequent initiative. Thus it is possible that the
immediate effect of Lifetime Health Cover may have been
less potent in the absence of the pre-existing 30% rebate.
Conclusion
Our study has developed and applied a policy characteri-
sation model based on measuring shifts in use of PHI
immediately prior to, and immediately following imple-
mentation of changes in federal health care policy. Our
results indicate that Lifetime Health Cover was associated
with an immediate increase in patients in hospital using
PHI. While the 30% rebate for PHI introduced 18 months
earlier did not have an immediate desired effect, the limi-
tations of the model are such that we cannot be certain
what, if any, latent contribution to the change in private:
public mix may have occurred. From this study we con-
clude that an outcome-based policy characterisation
model is useful in evaluating immediate effects of changes
in health care policy.
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